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Scientific Evidence in the Law
By JAMES R. RICHARDSON*
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
Recognizing the inherent weaknesses, inaccuracies and even
the occasional uselessness of definitions, we, nevertheless, as a
fundamental premise for discussional purposes, may define evi-
dence as testimonial or physical data deemed judicially competent
to demonstrate the existence or nonexistence of facts in issue.
As to scientific evidence, the term may properly be regarded as
referring to asserted facts which have been established or dis-
established, through the application of physical or social science
techniques, to a high degree of certainty, if not conclusively so.
With a working definition of scientific evidence at his com-
mand, the analyst, in striving to ascertain the legitimate impact of
scientific evidence on our judicial institutions, and consequently
upon society as whole, must be aware of certain operational
factors which have been inculcated into our legal processes.
These factors are based upon well-established principles, and
perhaps upon well-considered thought, in the seeking of judicial
truth by a democratic society. These factors may be manifestly
tangible in nature, and on the other hand, in some aspects, may
partake of the intangible. They may in some respects refer to
purely mechanical application of factual findings, while yet again
the controlling factor in the utilization of scientific evidence may
be some recognized philosophical tenet or doctrine.
Specifically, the problem of investigating the true functions
of scientific evidence makes it incumbent upon the investigator to
consider methods of ascertaining facts, the methods of applying
factual data, and the relative weight to be given factual evidence
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in the light of desired objectives of our society. This means that
in evaluating the projection of scientific evidence into all justici-
able controversies one must be cognizant of:
1) The evolution of fact-finding processes,
2) Distinctions between law and fact,
3) Techniques of ascertaining facts,
4) Judge and jury as fact-finding media,
5) Principles of a fair trial.
Briefly recapitulated, in determining the ultimate value to be
had from scientific findings of fact it is essential that we determine
how facts will be ascertained, what agency will apply the facts
to an issue, how they will be applied and to what extent accepted
as a verity under the broad and general concept of due process of
law.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to attempt an investiga-
tion of fact-finding processes and the role that judge, jury and
science play in the over-all development of evidentiary concepts.
The purpose, in limited space, is to examine certain recent sci-
entific developments in the law of evidence, in the light of recog-
nized objectives of the law, and, if possible, to determine what
weight may be legitimately accorded to scientific evidence by our
legal institutions.
Science has made rich contributions to the law in the adminis-
tration of justice, both in rationalizing legal processes and in
furthering the attainment of desired ends. Legal institutions on
their part have generally not been slow in adopting the fruits of
scientific research as an adjunct to their fact-finding processes.
In this adoptive procedure, however, the law must proceed by
intelligent selection and discriminating caution. The social sci-
ences can through tested techniques develop controlled method-
ology; and the pure sciences through the perseverance of almost
endless trial and error can eventually certify certain findings.
As for the law, it has no laboratory aside from the courtroom
for testing its theories. Hence, it seeks a high degree of certainty
and predictability in most fields as a necessary expedient in avoid-
ing experimentation in the application of legal sanctions. Science
and the law differ not only in methods but in objectives as well.
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That is, the objectives differ if the law is conceived as part of
the social process rather than as natural phenomena.
Science, through its analytical and investigatory procedures,
seeks to resolve the whole into parts; the organism into organs;
the obscure into the known. Science does not inquire into the
social values and ideal possibilities of things as does the law; it is
content to show their present actuality and operation. Science
narrows its gaze resolutely in regarding the nature and processes
of things as they are; the scientist is as impartial as the forces of
nature.
But, the law, as an institution for controlling human conduct
and regulating human relations, must go beyond the scientifically
determined fact as such; it must seek to determine its relation to
society in the light of experience and determine its worth and
reliability as an operative fact in jurisprudential thought. The
law combines fact and experience in interpretive correlation; the
law is philosophic as opposed to scientific, in that it coordinates
wisdom and desire in the light of experience as a way of life.
Science through nuclear fission releases the pent up forces of
nature. Science tells us how to kill and how to save life. The law
as part of the social process tells us through enlightenment when
to kill and when to save life. Science is objective, while the law
is subjective, and the law must ever accept scientific truths to be
weighed in the scales of justice as determined by the experience
of life.
Considering these preliminary remarks as something in the
nature of orientation, it is proposed to examine certain develop-
ments in scientific evidence with emphasis on their competency,
the weight to which they are entitled and the weight which they
are actually accorded.
1. BLOOD ALCOHOL LEvELs As EVIDENCE OF INTOXICATION.
The Swedish scientist, Widmark, demonstrated in 1932 by
experimental work that blood alcohol determinations are valuable
indices of intoxication.' A chemical analysis of the blood itself
shows what percent or proportion of alcohol is in the blood. Fol-
lowing this experimentation, devices variously known as "drunko-
I For practical aspects of the question see Ladd and Gibson, Legal-Medical
Aspects of Blood Tests to Determine Intoxication, 29 VA. L. REv. 749 (1943).
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meter", "intoximeter" and "breathalizer" were developed for the
purpose of ascertaining blood achohol content through various
breath tests. The basic theory of the Harger or "drunkometer"
breath test is that the breath of a suspect will reveal the extent to
which the blood is saturated; it is a calculated proportion. The
conclusion reached after exhaustive tests was that with 0.15
alcoholic blood content a person is definitely intoxicated and unfit
to safely drive a car. The middle zone of 0.05 to 0.14 is stated to
be in effect the twilight zone where many are actually intoxicated,
but established as non-intoxicated for those who "can carry their
liquor better". But, Dr. Harger believes anyone whose blood is
0.10 percent saturated is unfit to drive an automobile.2
The drunkometer test was first used in 1936 and is now used
by police in thirty-eight states and in twelve foreign countries.
This is not to be taken as indicative of unanimity in acceptance
by the courts, though a majority have let the results of such tests
go to the jury. One court in admitting such evidence, over ob-
jection, was of the opinion that the fact that there is a lack of
unanimity in the medical profession as to whether intoxication
can be determined by testing the breath held that this issue goes
to the weight of the testimony and does not destroy its admissi-
bility.3 The court in substantiating its decision pointed out that
medical science recognizes at least sixty pathological conditions
which produce symptoms similar to those produced by alcohol,
yet the law permits non-expert testimony of lay witnesses to
testify to objective symptoms commonly associated with alcoholic
intoxication on the theory that sobriety or intoxication are matters
of common knowledge. The court's argument on this point is not
convincing. A witness testifies as to facts observed and recorded
by his senses and on the basis of this is permitted to testify, "in
my opinion the defendant was intoxicated". But the drunkometer,
so to speak, makes an examination and then testifies "the de-
fendant was intoxicated". In view of such "testimony" and the
weight it can be expected to carry with the jury such evidence
should be generally accepted by science as reliable before it is
regarded as competent.
2 People v. Kovacik, 128 N.Y.S. 2d 492, 205 Misc. 275 (1954). This being a
case of first impression in New York, it carries diagrams and formulae in detail
about the Drunkometer, and testimony of the inventor, Dr. Harger, of Indiana
University. 3 People v. Bobczyk, 343 II. App. 504, 99 N.E. 2d 567 (1951).
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In yet another case expert witnesses, on cross-examination,
admitted there was disagreement among scientists as to the
Harger breath test for intoxication; nevertheless, the court held
that such objection goes to the credibility and not to the ad-
missibility of the evidence.4 Attaching "credibility" to a scientific
testing device is novel in itself, and the court in effect permits an
unqualified expert to testify. Proper recognition must be given to
reliable scientific evidence if cases are to be decided by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence rather than a preponderance of the
perjury, but a test becomes a scientific test only when it is ac-
cepted by science. As a minimum requirement a test should
"fairly show" the guilt or innocence of an accused.
In still another case the defendant appealed from a conviction
of negligent homicide, assigning as error the admission of testi-
mony concerning the result of a test voluntarily taken by him on
the Harger Drunkometer. 5 The state relied on proof of it being
generally accepted by the medical profession that:
a) chemical analysis of a specimin of the blood or other body
fluid will accurately disclose the percentage of alcohol contained
in the blood.
b) when the blood alcohol concentrate of a subject is 0.15 per
cent or more, by weight, he is under the influence of intoxicating
liquor to the extent of impairing his ability to operate a motor
vehicle.
On the basis of such general scientific recognition, the ques-
tion before the court was whether the breath test applied by
the Harger Drunkometer would furnish an accurate index of
the alcoholic content of the blood. Two policemen trained by
the inventor, Harger, and a doctor who had once been a student
assistant of the inventor testified that it would. Their testimony
included a complex explanation of the underlying theory and
modus operandi of the machine. To the contrary, however, five
physicians testified that the device was no more reliable than a
slot machine, and that the medical profession did not consider
the device reliable.' Swayed by such expert testimony, the court
4 McKay v. State, 235 S.W. 2d 173 (Tex. Cr. App. 1950).
5 People v. Morse, 325 Mich. 270, 38 N.W. 2d 322 (1949).
6 The-views of the five doctors testifying for the defendant finds direct sup-
port in a report appearing in 26 JouRN. Cmnm. L. AnD CnmuN. 512 (1986).
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held that the evidence supplied from the drunkometer findings
should not have been admitted, there being insufficient evidence
of general scientific recognition of the tests. The state interposed
the ingenious argument that the rule as to admission of "lie
detector" tests was not applicable to the drunkometer as the one
related to a mental state and the other to a physical condition.
The court found it unnecessary to answer this distinction, as it
was of the opinion that both the lie detector and the drunkometer
were devices involving scientific tests, the accuracy of which
could scarcely be determined by a jury on the basis of compli-
cated, scientific testimony concerning the theory and operation
of the devices, in the face of a difference of scientific opinions as
to their accuracy.
If it be conceded for discussional purposes that breath testing
devices are reliable and generally accepted, then police officers
trained to operate the drunkometer could competently testify as
to the taking of the test and under what circumstances and the
results, but their testimony that the result indicated intoxication
would be hearsay. It would be necessary for a foundation to be
laid by medical experts as to what per cent of alcohol in the blood
indicated intoxication, in the absence of a statute arbitrarily
adopting a percentage.8 On this general issue, it may be stated as
a realistic proposition that where a scientific advancement has
been made in the field of medicine or related fields, to the degree
where, with some accuracy under proper circumstances, certain
reasons may be excluded as the producing cause of a resultant
condition, and that fact has enjoyed legislative sanction as a
proper evidential aid to the courts, but does not admit of that
degree of infallibility or preciseness as to be a conclusive de-
termination thereof, such evidential aid should be employed with
7 On the basis of general acceptance by the medical profession that a blood
analysis will reveal alcoholic content, it is held that evidence of the taking of
such specimen at or near the time in question, of its chemical analysis, and of the
alcoholic content of the blood as determined by such analysis, together with expert
opinion testimony as to what the presence of such alcoholic content in the blood
indicates with respect to the subject's sobriety or intoxication are admissible. 20
Am. Jun. (1948 Supp.); Evidence Sec. 875 (1948 Supp.); Annot. 127 A.L.R.
1513; 159 A.L.R. 209; State v. Duguid, 50 Ariz. 276, 72 P. 2d 435 (1937); State
v. Mokrid, Iowa, 286 N.W. 412 (1931); Kuroske v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 234
Wis. 394, 291 N.W. 384 (1940).
sKy. RFv. STAT. 189.520 (1955). Chemical analysis to determine alcohol
content of blood in drunken driving cases.
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the utmost caution and only to the degree expressly sanctioned
by the legislature which endorsed it.
2. PHYSIOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TRuTH AND DECEPTION
TESTS.
Tests employed to determine the truth or falsity of statements
made by the subject fall into three groups:
a) the association-reaction test in which the length of time
the person being examined takes to think of words associated
with those in a list given him, some of which are neutral and
some of which may evoke a guilty association, is carefully meas-
ured and compared.
b) the respiratory test, which is based upon the hypothesis
that the breathing of the subject varies in rapidity according to
whether he is telling the truth or falsifying.
c) the systolic blood pressure test through the use of mechani-
cal means.
The last named test is discussed at some length in this section
inasmuch as it is the most commonly used and widely known. In
1921 the scientist Larson began work on truth and deception
tests. He constructed a portable "polygraph" known as the "lie
detector" for recording relative changes in pulse, blood pressure
and respiration. It is the underlying theory of this test that the
so-called guilt reaction, due to anxiety, produces physiological
changes which may be measured and accurately evaluated.' Pro-
fessor Inbau and Dr. Keeler of Northwestern University have
done much pioneering and developmental work in the field. The
instrument they use is similar to an ordinary blood pressure cuff.
It is placed on the arm and pressure from the artery is carried to
an attachment that registers with a pen based on a pivot which
leaves a graph on paper being wound at a rate of six inches per
minute. Another attachment likewise registers respiration, based
on the assumption, or fact, that most people who deliberately
make false statements will show physical reaction, that is a rise
and fall in blood pressure and a subconscious block in respiration.
9 Trovillo, A History of Lie Detection, 29 JouRN. CPam. L. AND CRIMUN. 848
(19:39); see also, Larson, Lying and its Detection (1932); Inbau, Lie Detection
and Criminal Interrogation (1942).
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Objections to the use of lie detectors in judicial proceedings
may be classified as:
1) objections resulting from either a misunderstanding of the
machine or its proposed place in the trial,
2) objections, which although directed at the lie detector,
apply equally to all expert testimony based-upon scientific investi-
gation, and
8) valid objections arising from the unusual nature of the lie
detector.
Critics fear that conscious faking or emotional reactions other
than fear of deception, such as nervousness, excitement or fear
of the test may cause a wrong diagnosis. Proponents say that
conscious faking is foiled by the recording of involuntary physical
reactions, change in blood pressure, pulse rate and electrodermal
response. Dr. Keeler points out that the examination procedure
is designed to discount irrelevant factors and that, in order that
the effects of existing environment, the present emotional state,
and the physical condition of the subject may be determined, a
polygraph recording is made for some minutes during which no
questions are asked. Whatever the existing physiological and
emotional condition might be, the resulting polygraph curves in-
dicate the "norm" for the period of the test. After this "norm"
has been established, two or three irrelevant questions are asked,
then questions pertaining to the crime, intermingled with other
irrelevant questions. Each question is worded briefly and must
call for a "yes" or "no" answer. The examiner's mode of asking
questions must be uniform as to rate, volume and inflection of
speech throughout the test.10
From the foregoing it will be seen that the lie detector tests
must be given by an expert. And the experts ascribe from 85 per
cent to 94 per cent accuracy to the lie detector." It is doubtful
that any eye-witness in an honest attempt to relate past events
could be quite so accurate. Any given witness may be affected by
10 Keeler, Debunking the Lie Detector, 25 JounN. Cum. L. AND CrmnnN. 153
(1934).
11 Summers, Science Can Get the Confession, 8 FoPDumm L. REv. .334
(1938); Inbau, The Lie Detector, 40 Sci. MON. 81 (1935); Keeler, Methods of
Detection of Deception, 1 AM. J. POL. SO. 42; Marston, Psychological Possibilities.
in the Deception Test, 11 J. Cmam. L. AND CumnN. 551 (1939).
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factors that will, consciously or unconsciously color his testimony.
These factors could be: 1) Predispositional traits or character-
istics, 2) Environmental developments of personality, 3) Physical
deficiences of perception or other senses, 4) Errors inherent in
even the average retention span, 5) Coercion or undue influence.
The previously listed objections to lie detector evidence may
tend to lose strength in the light of the weaknesses to be ac-
credited to other evidence generally held admissible in trials,
civil and criminal. The fear or distrust of lie detectors is in part
due to the conception that the machine itself will become a "wit-
ness", and that the testimony of the expert based thereon will not
be the real issue. This objection can be voiced to other scientific
evidence. In evaluating the lie detector it must be borne in mind
that it is not properly used to establish any independent fact in
issue; its primary, indeed its sole purpose, is to demonstrate the
worth of a witness' testimony through tending to sustain or dis-
credit his credibility." Perhaps the fault in this respect is that
lie detectors are commonly thought to have no other function
than that of establishing guilt or innocence.
Perhaps the most deep-rooted prejudice to the lie detector,
which is also based on misunderstanding, is due to the belief that
the lie detector may replace the fact finding function of the jury.
So long as the issue on which evidence adduced by a lie detector
is submitted to a jury this cannot happen. Should the time come
when a lie detector is regarded as infallible in its findings, then to
the extent used it will replace the jury.
Courts are reluctant to admit evidence based on lie detectors
for what it is worth, to be evaluated by the jury.13 However, sci-
entific evidence is used in many ways to connect a defendant with
a crime: to show that he committed the act or his presence at the
scene; and it is used to show mental and physical condition. But,
a lie detector's findings are "testimonial" in character in that it is
12 People v. Forte, 167 Misc. 868, 4 N.Y.S. 1913 2d (1938).
13 As early as 1938 over 100 police departments used the lie detector in
detection of crime. Trovillo, A., History of Lie Detection, 29 J. CutM. L. AND
CluMIN. 848 (1939). One police department reports use of the machine in 4,000
cases investigated over a three-year period and in those cases where deception
was indicated 55% later confessed and a substantial percentage of the remaining
45 was subsequently convicted, 161 SCIENTIFIC 8 (1930). The chief value of the
lie detector at present is in investigation of crime and pointing to competent
evidence. See McEvoy, The Lie Detector Goes Into Business, 38 READERs' DIGEST
69 (1941).
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directed at the testimony of a witness. Judicial thought is not yet
oriented to have an inanimate machine attack the credibility of a
witness. Wigmore once remarked, "If there ever is devised a
psychological test for the evaluation of witnesses, the law will run
to meet it." 14 Still later, however, he wrote, "Looking back at the
range of possibilities for experimental psychometric methods of
ascertaining concrete data for valuing testimonial evidence, it will
be seen that thus far the only new psychometric method that has
demonstrated any utility is the blood pressure method, which
detects lies; . . . the record of psychometric achievement with
testimony is still meager . . . The conditions required for truly
scientific observations and experiments are seldom practicable.
The testimonial mental processes are so complex and variable
that millions of instances must be studied before safe generaliza-
tions can be made.""5
This last observation, in general, reflects the attitude of courts
to lie detectors. In one case it was said that the systolic blood
pressure deception test for determining the truthfulness of testi-
mony has not yet gained such standing and scientific recognition
as to justify the admission of expert testimony deduced from tests
made under such theory and in the absence of testimony that in-
dicates there is a general scientific recognition of such tests in
that it is established that reasonable certainty follows from such
tests, it would be error to admit the test in evidence. 6 In another
case a defendant had favorable findings by a lie detector rejected
by a court in stating that just when a scientific principle or dis-
covery crosses the line between the experimental and demon-
strable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight
zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and
while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony
deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery,
the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular
field in which it belongs.'
14 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, Sec. 875 (2nd ed. 1923),
15 WIGMORE, PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL PROOF (2d ed. 1931). General admissi-
bility of evidence obtained by scientific and analysis: 6 Alx. L. REV. 181 (1951);
5 U. FLA. L. REV. 5 (1952); Symposium, 5 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 275-588 (1948).
16 People v. Becker, 300 Mich. 562, 2 N.W. 2d 503 (1942).
17 Frye v. United States, 54 App. D.C. 46, 293 F. 1013 (1923). In accord:
People v. Wochnick, 98 Cal. App. 2d 124, 219 P. 2d 70 (1950); State v. Bshner,
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However, not all of the cases are negative in regard to use of
the lie detector. A New York court admitted findings based on a
pathometer or psychogalvanometer (lie detector) test over the
objection of the state's attorney. The court reviewed the fact that
scientific evidence is admitted in other fields for the jury to
evaluate, though experts differ as to their findings. The court then
concludes that the time has come for the courts to recognize the
efficacy of lie detectors where the testimony, as that before the
court, of experts showed laboratory tests in excess of ninety per
cent accuracy, and that in cases of those actually accused of crime
the emotions and reactions would be more intense with results
approaching one hundred per cent accuracy.' 8 So far as has been
ascertainable, no appellate court has held that a lie detector can
be used on an accused without his consent and the evidence so
attained being considered competent.' 9
3. NARCOANALYSiS-TRuTH SERUM.
Such drugs as scopolamine and the barbituates (sodium
pentothol and sodium amytal), acting as a central nervous system
depressant to relieve tension and produce relaxation in a subject,
are commonly used in psychiatric examinations. Perhaps the lay-
man is of the impression that the "truth serum" is an infallible pro-
ducer of truth from a suspect unable to offer conscious resistance.
Actually it is not a serum at all and the subject does not always
tell the truth. In brief, experimental findings demonstrate that
only those persons who have a conscious or subconscious desire to
reveal the truth will affirmatively respond to interrogation under
the influence of a "truth Serum". The principal value of narco-
analysis is found in its use by psychiatrists who seek to make full
examinations of patients' personality structures for future treat-
ment.20
210 Wis. 651, 246 N.W. 314 (1933); People v. Forte, 279 N.Y. 204, 18 N.E. 2d
31 (1931); State v. Lowry, 163 Kan. 622, 185 P. 2d 147 (1947); State v. Cole,
354 Mo. 181, 189 S.W. 2d 541 (1945). See, Anno. 119 A.L.R. 2d 1198.
I8 People v. Kenny, 167 Misc. 51, 3 N.Y.S. 2d 348 (1938). See: Peller, Sci-
entific Aids in Proof, 13 ST. JoaNs L. REv. 328 (1938); Summers, Science Can Get
the Confession, 8 FoRD. L. REv. 334 (1939); McCormick, Deception Tests and the
Law of Evidence, 15 CALmF. L. REv. 484 (1927).
10 People v. Sims, 395 Ill. 69, 69 N.E. 2d 336 (1946).
2) Dession, Donnelly, Freedman, Redlich, Drug Induced Revelation and
Criminal Investigation, 62 YALE L. JourN. 315 (1953).
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The cases on narcoanalysis are few. In one case on the subject
it was held that the defendant's motion to have a psychiatrist
appointed to examine him under the influence of sodium penathol
was properly rejected. The court stated that such proof would
be hearsay, self-serving and conjectural since the truth thereof
would depend entirely on the psychiatrist's opinion which con-
ceivably might conflict with the opinion of another psychiatrist.21
On the basis of the reasons stated by the court, objections to
"truth Serum" evidence can be expected to be categorized as a
mental trepanning amounting to an illegal search and seizure of
the defendant's mind. This would be a valid objection if the drug
were administered involuntarily.
4. BLOOD GROUPING TESTS.
Forensic Immunology, identification by human blood groups:
Landsteiner made the first observations regarding differences be-
tween bloods of normal human beings in 1900.22 This ushered in
the important blood grouping determinations, primarily used as
evidence of non-paternity.2 3
The Landsteiner or Bernstein blood-grouping test is rather
widely used by courts in paternity cases. This test is predicated
upon the established medical theory that the red corpuscles in
human blood contain two affirmative agglutinating substances,
and that every individual's blood falls into one of four classes and
remains the same throughout life. According to the Mendelian
law of inheritance, this blood individuality is an hereditary char-
acteristic which passes from parent to child, and no agglutinating
substance can appear in the blood of a child which is not present
in the blood of one of its parents. So, it follows, for example, that
if according to expert testimony the blood of a child contains
the agglutiongen "B" which is not present in the blood of the
21 People v. Cullen, 37 Cal. 2d 614, 284 P. 2d 1 (1951). The court relied on
and cited People v. McNichol, 100 Cal. App. 2d 554, 224 P. 2d 1 (1950), and
Estate of Packer, 164 Cal. 525, 129 P. 778 (1913). See also People v. McCracken,
39 Cal. 2d 336, 246 P. 2d 913 (1952).2 2 Landsteiner, 27 Zentralbl. f. Bakteriol, Parasitenk W. Infestonskrankh 357
(1900).
23 See, Boyd, Protecting the Evidentiary Value of Blood Group Determina-
tions, 16 So. CALIF. L. RErV. 193 (1943); Maguire, A Survey of Blood Group De-
cisions and Legislation in the American Law of Evidence, 1 So. CALIF. L. REv. 161
(1943); Schoc]k, Determination of Paternity by Blood Grouping Tests, The Euro-
pean Experience, 16 So. CALIF. L. RBv. 177 (1943).
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mother, then it must be present in the blood of the father. And,
if the defendant, and alleged father, does not have this substance,
he is not the father. Science accepts the test as conclusive.
The most celebrated case involving a blood-grouping test to
determine non-parentage also demonstrates the supposed right of
a jury to disregard conclusive scientific evidence.24 Despite ex-
clusionary evidence of non-parentage, the case was allowed to go
to the jury, which capriciously disregarded conclusive scientific
evidence in finding the defendant the legal father of an unwed
mother's illegitimate child, as opposed to a biological father which
he was not. The jury's fact finding prerogative was preserved
through its right to determine the qualifications of the experts
who made the test and their impartiality, though these were not
in issue.
Can such a verdict be justified? Did the jury reach objectives
of society in a proper manner? These inquiries imply that perhaps
such a verdict has social aspects. Apparently the jury's verdict
was based on evidence that it was mere chance, rather than the
exercise of restraint or discretion, which excluded the defendant
from parentage; and also upon the belief that the defendant had a
moral duty to contribute to the support of the child, as he had
contributed to the moral delinquency and consequent unwed
motherhood of the plaintiff through persons unknown. The
modest verdict, relatively so in view of the wealth of the de-
fendant, indicates that the jury in fixing a sum for the care and
education of the infant was penalizing a philanderer and assisting
an innocent child victim of a clandestine assignation, rather than
appropriating a share in the estate to an actual daughter and
potential heir. Is the jury's fact-finding function so sacred that it
should be guaranteed to the extent of overriding scientifically
established facts?
5. TRAFFiC CONTROL DEVICES, RADAR.
Radar equipped cars for speed zoning can accurately record
the speed of motor vehicles at given points. Such devices are
24 Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App. 2d 562, 168 P. 2d 442 (1946). For cases
further developing the law on blood grouping tests see: Shanks v. Maryland, 185
Md. 437, 45 A. 2d 85. 163 A.L.R. 931 (1945); Arais v. Kalensnikoff, 10 Cal. 2d
428, 74 P. 2d 1043 115 A.L.R. 16 (1937); Schulze v. Schulze, 35 N.Y.S. 2d 218(Sup. Ct. 1942), discussed in 29 Iowa L. REV. 121 (1943); In re Swahn's Will,
158 Misc. 17, 285 N.Y.S. 234 (1936); Jordan v. Mace, 69 A. 2d 670 (Me. 1949),
and compare Jordan v. Davis, 143 Me. 185, 57 A. 2d 209 (1948).
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becoming widely used and it is claimed that they can become a
decisive factor in the reduction of highway accidents. The present
problem is one of carrying on the tests in a manner to make the
results admissible in evidence.
Few cases involving conviction for traffic violations based
solely on radar detection have come before state appellate courts
for review. Of those which have been up for review not one
sustaining a lower court conviction has been found. Under radar
detection, a passing car on the highway breaks a beam of elec-
trical energy which actuates a needle on a dial in the parked
"radar car", registering the speed of the passing vehicle. In a case
rejecting and reversing a conviction based on such radar detection
the court stated,
Law enforcement should keep in stride with the
advances of science and courts should receive scientific
proof when presented in accordance with the established
rules of evidence. These rules have safeguarded our lives,
our freedoms and our property since the establishment of
the common law, and should not be lightly set aside in the
name of convenience. It may be that these electronic de-
vices will become a great and much needed weapon in the
armory of law enforcement. The science which embraces
electronics is wonderful and mystifying. It brings into our
homes voices from the far side of the world. On the screens
of our television sets we see the images of events occurring
many hundreds of miles away. With searching eye it peers
into the heavens, alert to detect the approach of a foe by
air. It guides giant missiles at supersonic speed into outer
space, probing its mysteries and from great height detects
an enemy target selected for destruction. In a hundred
other ways it touches our lives today. In the not too distant
future this science may bring civilization the horrors of a
push-button war, but it must not bring push-button justice
unless and except such justice is surrounded by the long-
established rules of evidence.26
25 People of City of Rochester v. Torpey, 128 N.Y.S. 2d 864, 204 Misc. 1028
(1953). (Requiring evidence to establish the fact that radar is scientifically
recognized as an accurate means of measuring speed).
26People v. Offerman, 125 N.Y.S. 2d 179, 204 Misc. 759 (1953). Scientific
evidence generally: Elaborate scientific investigation to reveal the sender of a
bomb through the mail, Magnuson v. State, 187 Wis. 122, 203 N.W. 749; a
strikingly similar case, State v. Clark, 156 Wash. 543, 287 P. 18 (1930); Identifica-
tion of hit and run driver by button impression and print of fiber on car, from
clothing of the victim, People v. Wallace, 353 Ill. 95, 186 N.E. 540 (1933);
Particles of strangled victim's lipstick found in the pores of the murderer's hands,
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In reversing convictions based upon radar detection of speed
violations, the courts have relied upon one or more of three points:
a) lack of qualification of the "radar car" operators as experts,
b) lack of proof that radar speed detection equipment is a
scientifically accepted method of accurately measuring the speed
of motor vehicles, or
c) the hearsay character of the evidence, in that the testifying
officer relied on information relayed to him by his co-ordinating
colleague.
It is not too far-fetched to envision a well taken objection to
the validity of the arrest in such cases. The misdemeanor, speed-
ing, is not committed in the presence of the arresting officer, who
acts in reliance on information relayed to him.
6. ScmNwn'ic TEST FOR PREGNANCY.
In a prosecution for murder by abortion, the issue was whether
or not the deceased was actually pregnant, pregnancy being an
essential element of abortion in Colorado.2 7 The deceased had
shortly before her illness and death taken a specimen of urine
to a doctor for analysis. (His testimony was based on hearsay as
he relied on the deceased's statement that the specimen was from
her body). The so-called "rabbit test" for pregnancy was used
requiring injection of the urine into the blood stream of: a) a
virgin female rabbit, b) that had not been in proximity to a male,
c) which was from four months to seventeen weeks old, d) and
weighed approximately four pounds.
For the test to be made properly all four of the above conditions
must exist concurrently, and in such case the test is described as
ninety percent accurate.
Conviction was reversed for the reason that pregnancy had not
been proven, based in part on the fact that the doctor could not
state from his knowledge the source of the body fluid, and in part
on failure to prove the age, weight and spotless reputation of the
State v. Johnson, 37 N.M. 280, 21 P. 2d 813 (1933); Analysis of dirt on criminal's
shoes, Territory v. Young, 32 Hawaii, 628 (1933); See also, WIGMORE, SCIENCE OF
JuDmc_ L PROOF, Sec. 158 (3d ed. 1937); M. E. O'Neill, Police Microanalysis (De-
bris and Fibers) 25 Joua. *6 Cmi. L. AND Cam iNr. 674, 835 (1935); Koehler,
Tracing the Lindbergh Kidnapping Ladder, 27 JoJiR. or Crms. L. AND CarHN. 712
27 Cabianchi v. People, 111 Colo. 298, 141 P. 2d 688 (1943).
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rabbit. The decision serves to illustrate that some scientific de-
velopments may strain the credulity of the court, if not the jury
as is usually the case.
SEF_-INcRIMnI34AnON UNDER Sci:ENFIc EVIDENCE
The issue of self-incrimination or violation of due process of
law under the types of scientific evidence discussed in this paper
is most frequently raised in situations involving the taking of body
fluids as evidence. This is not to say that the problem is not pres-
ent in the lie detector cases, but the cases in point are relatively
few. Where the question of the admissibility of evidence as to
chemical analysis, or lack thereof, of a body fluid is presented, it
will come within one of three factual situations: (1) when the
test is voluntarily submitted to, (2) when there is a refusal to
undergo the test, or (8) when the test is involuntary, or "consent"
of the subject is lacking.
As to the first category it may be stated as a general rule
governing the testing of body fluids with relation to intoxication
that from the cases it is apparent that subject to compliance with
conditions as to relevancy in point of time, tracing and identifica-
tion of the specimen, accuracy of the analysis, and qualification
of the witness as an expert in the field, there is rather general
agreement that when the prosecution in a criminal case seeks to
establish the intoxication of the accused, evidence as to the ob-
taining of a specimen of his body fluid at or near the time in ques-
tion, evidence as to the alcoholic content of such specimen, as de-
termined by scientific analysis, and expert opinion testimony as
to what the presence of the ascertained amount of alcohol in the
blood, urine, or other body fluid of an individual indicates with
respect to the matter of such individual's intoxication or sobriety,
is ordinarily admissible as relevant and competent evidence upon
the issue of intoxication, at least where the accused voluntarily
furnished the specimen for the test, or submitted without objec-
tion to its taking.
28
28 Anno. 159 A.L. 210; 127 A.L.R. 1514. Constitutional rights in taking a
drunkometer test are not violated where the evidence shows that the accused
freely and voluntarily consented thereto, under conditions where he was mentally
and physically able and free to make a choice, and with full knowledge that the
results of the test might later be used for or against him. Ray v. State, 120 N.E.
2d 176 (Ind. 1954); Logan v. State, 269 P. 2d 380 (Okla. 1954).
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As to refusal to take a blood test for chemical analysis, it is
held that where one arrested for intoxication refuses to take an
intoxication test, the fact of refusal may be introduced in evi-
dence, and this though the defendant at all times denies his
guilt.2 9 And one court stated that to hold to the contrary would
further the confusion between the admissibility of a circumstance
in evidence and its weight when admitted; it is for the jury to
say if fear of the result dictated the defendant's refusal, or de-
termine if he had some other reason for the failure to cooperate. 30
The question of the admissibility of evidence of refusal to take
an intoxication test is related to a field containing two well estab-
lished types of cases:
1) those in which, by statement or by silence when confronted
by an accusatory statement, the defendant is deemed to have
made an admission that tends toward establishment of guilt,'31
2) those in which by some positive action the defendant
causes an inference of some consciousness of guilt to arise; illus-
trative of such cases is evidence of the flight of the accused, gen-
erally held to be relevant.32
Refusal of an accused person to take a test for intoxication
would seem to fall within this second grouping. It is not what
the defendant says or refuses to say that is significant, but rather
what he does or refuses to do that may give rise to a presumption.
There is a close analogy to be drawn between the circumstances
of flight from the scene or the use of an alias and that of refusal
to submit to a harmless scientific test as constituting a fact which
is indicative of a consciousness of guilt.33
Issues of a grave nature are raised in the third classification
of cases where results of tests are offered in evidence though the
defendant did not give his "consent" to the test being given.
2 9 States that have by statute made intoxieation tests competent evidence
generally provide as does Kentucky, that the accused may refuse to take such a
test, but such reusal may be commented on by the prosecutor. Ky. Bx~v. STAT.
189.520 (1955).
30 People v. Graves, 137 Cal. App. 1, 29 P. 2d 807 (1934); People v. McGin-
nis, 267 P. 2d 458 (Cal. 1953).
31 People v. Simmons, 28 Cal. 2d 699, 172 P. 2d 18 (1946), and cases cited.
32 People v. Liss, 35 Cal. 2d 570, 219 2d 789 (1950).
33 Following the general rule that evidence of one's refusal to take a blood
test when arrested for drunkenness is admissible. State v. Benson, 230 Iowa 1168,
300 N.W. 275 (1941).
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Consent may be lacking for any one of three reasons: (1) the
test was given compulsorily, (2) the accused was unable to give
consent due to unconsciousness or other cause, or (3) the accused
misunderstood the purpose of the test through trick, ruse or other
cause. Such facts may give rise to either a claim of self-incrimina-
tion or of violation of due process of law.
The Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, its counter-
part being found in most state constitutions, 34 states that, "... no
person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself nor be deprived of... liberty . . . without due
process of law." The issues arising hereunder give rise to several
pertinent inquiries: Does being a "witness against himself' apply
to oral testimony or does it include real evidence? Is a different
construction to be drawn if the provision is, cannot be "compelled
to give evidence against himself' as contained in Section 11 of
the Kentucky Constitution? With respect to "compelled" in the
light of the due process clause, does "compel" imply force or
coercion of an irresistible nature? On the other hand, can "con-
sent" be predicated on the mere failure to protest, or resist; or will
not ignorance of the right to resist, or fear under the distress of
arrest or confinement lead a prisoner to be passive, or even to
comply with a request to bare his body or submit to a blood test
under a sense of compulsion? Is it enough to show that the de-
fendant was a docile prisoner and failed to resist or protest? Can
there be a mental resistance as well as physical or vocal resistance?
Or must it be shown that the defendant voluntarily consented
under a voluntary expression of a free will? The foregoing are
some of the inquiries which should be borne in mind while
examining the possibilities of self-incrimination or violation of
due process in the taking of body fluids or applying other tests
to an accused.
The most generally accepted concept in regard to the con-
stitutional privilege against self-incrimination is that in history
and principle the doctrine seems to relate to protecting the ac-
cused from the process of extracting from his own lips against
34 The constitutions of all the states of the Union, with the exception of New
Jersey and Iowa contain provisions against self-incrimination. The protection is
from "testifying", or "furnishing evidence", or from "being a witness". The dis-
tinction as to wording has not been significant with respect to decisions on self-
incrimination. 8 WiGMorx, EvmENCE, Sec. 2252 (Sd ed. 1940).
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his will an admission of guilt, and in the better reasoned cases,
so it is argued, it does not extend to the exclusion of his body
or of his mental condition as evidence when such evidence is
material and relevant, even when such evidence is obtained by
compulsion.35 Consequently, it has been held that evidence
secured by a drunkometer, blood analysis, or urinary test is not
properly classified with confessions but rather is comparable with
such scientific tests for identity as fingerprints, 6 footprints,37
shoeprints, 3s or even the disclosure of bodily scars, birthmarks,
abnormalities or dentures.39 For, as once stated by Mr. Justice
Holmes, "but the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal
case to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of
physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from him,
not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be ma-
terial."40 Following through on this premise, it is held that an
accused may be required to "furnish evidence" by doing many
things without having his constitutional rights against self-in-
crimination invaded.4 '
On this point, distinction is made by some courts between the
admissibility of evidence of the result of a prisoner's affirmative
act or acts under compulsion, and the result accomplished without
his active participation, but against his will. The proposition is
well illustrated in a case involving two questions:4"
35 State v. Grayson, 239 N.C. 453, 80 S.E. 2d 387 (1954); State v. Thompson,
161 N.C. 238, 76 S.E. 249 (1912); State v. Rogers, 233 N.C. 390, 64 S.E. 2d 572
(1951); Blocker v. State, 92 Fla. 878, 110 So. 547 (1926); People v. Kauser, 315
II. 485, 146 N.E. 593 (1925); Comm. v. Millen, 289 Mass. 441, 194 N.E. 463
(1935); State v. Nelson, 162 Ore. 430, 92 P. 2d 182 (1939); Hunt v. State, 248
Ala. 217, 27 So. 2d 186 (1946); State v. Myers, 220 S.C. 309, 67 S.E. 2d 506.
Annot. 32 A.L.R. 2d 430 (1951). Annot., 164 A.L.R. 967 (1946); 22 C.J.S. Crim.
Law See 652 (1940); GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE, Sec. 469(c)(16th ed. 1899); WiG-
monE, EVMENCE, Sec. 2265 (3d ed. 1940).3 0 Payne v. State, 239 P. 2d 801 (Okla. Crim. Rep.) (1952).
37 Nowlin v. State, 65 Okla. Crim. Rep. 165, 83 P. 2d 601 (1938).
3 8 Goodberry v. State, 50 Okla. Grim. Rep. 185, 296 P. 985 (1931).
39 Ricketts v. State, 23 Okla. Crim. Rep. Rep. 267, 215 P. 212 (1928).
40 Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 31 S. Ct. 2 (1910).
41 For purposes of identification the accused may be required to stand up in
court; to appear at the scene of the crime, 3 WHARTON, CnmNAm EVIDENCE, Sec.
1141 (11th ed. 1935); to put on a jacket to see if it fits, Holt v. United States, 218
U.S. 245, 31 S. Ct. 2 (1910); to place a handkerchief over his face, Ross v. State,
204 Ind. 281, 182 N.E. 865 (1932); to expose body scars, State v. Oschoa, 49
Nev. 194, 242 P. 582 o(1926); and may be fingerprinted, photographed and
measured under the Bertillion system, Downs v. Swann, 111 Md. 53, 73 A. 65a
(1909); Connors v. State, 134 Tex. Cr. Rep. 278, 115 S.W. 2d 681 (1938).
42 State v. Griffin, 129 S.C. 200, 124 S.E. 81, 35 A.L.R. 1227 (1924).
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1) Was the testimony of the sheriff admissible to the effect
that he compared the shoe of the defendant with the tracks in the
potato patch, and that it fitted, when it appeared that he had
forced the defendant to remove her shoe and make the adjust-
ments herself?
2) Was the testimony of the sheriff admissible to the effect
that he compelled the defendant to put her foot in the track and
that she would not do it in the right way?
The first question was answered by the court in the affirmative
for the reason that in such instance the deefndant was not being
treated as a witness, the shoe and the comparison of the shoe
with the track were not the testimony of the defendant, but of
the sheriff, distinct from anything she may have said or done;
the shoe was obtained from her control without the use of any
process against her as a witness;43 she was not necessary to estab-
lish its authenticity, identity or origin, which facts were estab-
lished by the testimony of the sheriff.44 In answer to the second
question presented the court held that testimony as to the sheriff
compelling the defendant to put her foot in the track and her
conduct in doing so was inadmissible for the reason that the de-
fendant was required to do an affirmative act, and if the con-
formity had been perfect that fact would have appeared from
the enforced conduct of the defendant, clearly testimonial com-
pulsion. This seems a rather tenuous distinction. Does it mean
the sheriff could knock the defendant out, remove her shoe and
place it in the track, but should not force the defendant at gun
point to place her shod foot in the track? In any event it is ap-
parent that if a defendant has not given his "consent" to the tak-
ing of body fluid for chemical analysis, objection to the evidence
thereof must be made under lack of due process, if at all, and not
as self-incrimination. This is so though lack of "consent" in a
given case of this type is synonymous with "compulsion". 45
43 This is the "Wigmore doctrine" not limiting the Constitutional prohibition
against self-incrimination to "testimonial utterances", but extending it to protect
the individual "from any disclosure sought by legal rocess against him as a
witness", WiG oRE, EVDmENcE, See. 2263 (3d ed. 1940.
44 This position is stated to be the weight of authority, State v. Cram, 176 Or.
577, 160 P. 2d 283, 164 A.L.R. 952 (1945).
45 It is clear that the "compulsion" contemplated by the Constitution does not
refer to hope or fear brewed in the secret places of a person's mind, but to external
forces inducing such hope or fear. Compulsion is the keynote of the prohibition
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DUE PRocEss iN BODY FLUID ANALYSIS
The issue of due process is raised in cases of the third cate-
gory discussed above wherein the taking of blood or other body
fluid is under circumstances of compulsion or lack of consent.
The cases are in conflict in situations where a blood sample is
taken from one who has "passed out" or who has been knocked
unconscious in a motor vehicle accident. The cases are not rare
where an unconscious motorist while in the emergency room of
a hospital has a blood sample taken by an interne at the instance
of a police officer who suspects intoxication. A number of cases
have held that in prosecutions for manslaughter arising out of an
automobile collision, admission in evidence of the results of a
blood test to show intoxication did not violate due process of law
under the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution, though the
blood was withdrawn while the defendant was unconscious
after the accident. One reason given is that while compulsory
or involuntary testimony from a defendant may and should be
excluded, the rule should not be extended to cover real evidence
where not secured in a "brutal and shocking manner".46 Thus the
state is permited to make fortune out of misfortune. Fortunately
for the state the defendant is unconscious as a result of the ac-
cident, for it would not be permitted to "blackjack" him into in-
sensibility and secure evidence in a "brutal and shocking manner".
Such reasoning, based solely on the exigencies of the situation,
is utterly defenseless. In another case which involved taking
blood without the consent of the individual it was held that such
an act was an assault and battery and clearly an invasion of
personal privacy. The court felt that if such an encroachment on
the person were permitted it would be difficult to determine a
and to render evidence inadmissible on the ground that the defendant was com-
pelled to _produce it against himself it must appear that such compulsion was used
as to rob him of volition in the matter. People v. Corder, 244 Mich. 274, 221 N.W.
309 (1928). Annot. 18 L.R.A. (N.S.) 768 (1909).
46 Breithaupt v. Abram, 271 P. 2d 824 (N.M. 1954). See also, People v.
Block, 240 P. 2d 412 (Colo. 1952). The constitutional privilege would not bar
the use, in the prosecution of a defendant, of the results of a body fluid test even
though taken when he was so drunk as to be confused or unconscious or otherwise
in such a condition that it may not be said that he voluntarily consented thereto.
State v. Cram, 176 Or. 577, 160 P. 2d 283, 164 A.L.R. 952 (1945); People v.
Tucker, 88 Cal. App. 2d 883, 198 P. 2d 941 (1948); State v. Ayers, 70 Idaho 18,
211 P. 2d 142 (1949); State v. Sturtevant, 96 N.H. 99, 70 A. 2d 909 (1950);
People v. Spears, 114 N.Y.S. 2d 869, 201 Misc. 666 (1952); Bovey v. State, 93
N.Y.S. 2d 560 (1949); People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926).
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rational stopping point. It explored the supposition that in the
future medical science evolved a technique whereby the truth
could be infallibly secured from a witness by trepanning his skull;
it observed that no one would insist that such a dangerous opera-
tion be undergone in the interests of justice, but inquired as to
where the line is to be drawn between this extreme and the
relatively simple extraction of blood; yet is it not after all the
degree of risk involved but rather the invasion of a constitutional
right to personal security and privacy by whatever means that is
controlling?47
At this point in the discussion the case of Rochin v. California4s
is brought squarely into focus. When accosted by officers in his
room, the defendant, Rochin, swallowed capsules in his posses-
sion. He was handcuffed and rushed to a hospital where a doctor,
at the direction of the officers, forced him to swallow an emetic.
The defendant vomited two capsules of morphine, and on the
basis of this evidence was convicted of possession of narcotics
under state law. The case eventually reached the United States
Supreme Court where it was held that Rochin had been denied
due process of law. Mr. Justice Cardozo, in the course of the
opinion, stated that the conviction was obtained in a manner
that "shocked the conscience and approached the rack and the
screw." (Query: 1. Would the result be different if the emetic
had been treatment necessary to save life? 2. Would the result
be different had the man been insensible by the time the hospital
was reached?)
The Supreme Court has agreed to take under consideration
the cases involving the involuntary extraction of blood for
47 Bednarik v. Bednarik, 18 N.J. Misc. 633, 16 A. 2d 80 (1940). See dissent
in State v. Cram, 176 Or. 577, 160 P. 2d 283 (1945). Evidence held inadmissible:
Compulsory blood test to determine intoxication, State v. Height, 117 Iowa 650,
91 N.W. 935 (1902); Defendant accused of rape compelled to submit to examina-
tion for venereal disease, Wragg v. Griffin, 185 Iowa 243, 170 N.W. 400 (1919);
Blood for alcoholic content test extracted from unconscious person, State v. New-
comb, 220 Mo. 54, 119 S.W. 405 (1909).
48342 U.S. 165, 72 Sup. Ct. 205 (1952). For further discussion and in-
terpretation see: Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 72 Sup. Ct. 725 (1952).
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 73 Sup. Ct. 397 (1953); Brock v. North Carolina,
344 U.S. 424, 73 Sup. Ct. 349 (1953); Albertson v. Millard, D.C., 106 F. Supp.
635 (1952); People v. Sica, 112 Cal. App. 2d 547, 247 P. 2d 72 (1952); 9 WASH,
& LEE L. RIv. 192 (1952); 3 SYAcusE L. REv. 378 (1951); 4 STAN. L. REV. 591
(1951); 6 RulcEMs L. RBv. 612 (1951); 27 NovaE DAmE LAwYER 453 (1951);
23 Miss. L.J. 293 (1951); 50 MIcH. L. REV., 1367 (1951); 66 HAnv. L. REv. 122
(1952); 40 CALIF. L. REv. 311 (1952).
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chemical analysis. Will the Court draw a line of distinction be-
tween "compulsion" and "involuntary", thus establishing a mat-
ter of degree in criminal prosecutions where a defendant should
not be required to furnish a single link in the chain of evidence
that convicts him. The Court admitted that the confines of due
process cannot be rigidly defined, but left an opening for future
consideration of blood tests and similar techniques with the
observation:
We therefore put to one side the cases which have
arisen in the state courts through use of modem methods
and devices for discovering wrongdoers and bringing them
to book.
When the decision comes it should be to the effect that to
extract blood by means of a hypodermic needle from a person
accused of crime, without his consent and while he is uncon-
scious, for the purpose of obtaining evidence to aid in his con-
viction shocks the judicial sense of justice and decency; that it
scraps concepts of due process of law for law enforcement with
a vengence; that it will engender fear and disrespect for law, law
as applied in a police state; and that such action constitutes law
enforcement based upon violation of the law, and that no court
should place its judicial stamp of approval on such police
methods.
WEIGHT AND CONCLUSIVEINESS OF ScIEN-TIFIc EVIDENCE
If it be conceded that, under proper conditions, the recent
scientific developments in the law of evidence, which have been
discussed, are admissible in evidence, the compelling issue then
is what weight they are to be accorded under our system of trial
by jury. The problem must be examined in the light of mutual
objections:
(1) that legal institutions as structured cannot and do not
fully utilize scientific evidence.
(2) that judicial acceptance of a scientifically established fact
invades the province of the jury.
Briefly stated, a review of the cases reveals three threads of
judicial thought which can be untangled and identified with
respect to the weight and conclusiveness of scientific evidence:
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(1) The jury as triers of facts may reject uncontradicted and
unimpeached expert evidence.
(2) The jury may not disregard scientific evidence, but should
consider it along with all the other evidence in a case and at-
tribute to it the weight to which it is entitled.
(3) When matter in issue, peculiarly within the knowledge of
experts alone is established by scientific investigation, the finding
is conclusive and no issue of fact is presented for the jury.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the heart of the prob-
lem concerns the function of the trial jury in relation to state
objectives. It may be framed as the case of "strict law" v. "in-
dividualized justice", or "scientific evidence" v. "the general
verdict".
Disregarding the thought-provoking philosophical observa-
tions, such as law being a power process to bend the will of the
masses, and its corollary that morality is an invention of the weak
to restrain the strong; it may be stated for present purposes that
law is an institution by means of which society seeks to ma-
terialize its demands and expectations through bringing the "good
life" to the most people commensurate with its resources and
existing value concepts. Stated thus idealistically, society seeks
the ultimate in the shaping and sharing of values for the com-
munity as an entirety. Realistically, self-interests inevitably clash
with legitimate objectives either over-emphasized or temporarily
cast aside, but basically the ideal pattern remains an ever present
potential in a democratic society. Objectives necessarily change
with eventual developmental complexities of a formalized society,
nevertheless, the maintenance of peace and order remains the
fundamental objective upon which the realization of all other ob-
jectives of a politically organized group depends. In our juris-
prudential thought and practice the trial jury is accepted by
many as the judicial keystone for maintaining security of the
person and property as opposed to the perils of "official justice".
Experience has proven that trial juries can give to their
verdicts an elasticity and flexibility not possible, and possibly not
desirable, in the decisions of trial judges. Stare decisis is un-
known to the trial jury, which as a body tries one case only,
speaks from the anonymity of the twelve and is then dissolved.
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Can we reasonably assume that this so-called elasticity of "jury
law" was a planned state objective under determined efforts to
make trial by jury a part of the organic law through specific in-
corporation in State and Federal constitutions? If so, having
progressed from "magic" to "science" in manifestations of proof,
to what extent is the fact-finding prerogative of juries to be
legitimately exercised through disregarding scientific proof in
maintaining "elasticity?
As a generalization, an acceptable proposition is one to the
effect that the function of the jury is to find the facts as rational
men would be led to believe by the evidence and to apply the
law, as submitted by the court, to the facts so found.49 Rational
men sitting as trial jurors may often reach conclusions on con-
flicting testimony of lay observers, called as witnesses, which may
be debatable at least, but concerning which no strong disagree-
ment will be forthcoming. However, in cases where lay testimony
is in direct conflict with scientific proof,50 and the jury's verdict is
contrary to the conclusions of men of science, quite a different
problem is presented. Such an unscientific result is not fully
countered or set at rest by labeling trial juries as unreliable fact
finders. Actually, important issues of policy are presented where-
by it becomes necessary to examine and determine the over all
objectives of law and society. The trial jury is not to be con-
demned and scrapped as an anachronistic governmental whimsey
without first determining the standards of predictability or elas-
ticity which society demands of its legal institutions.
Two possible extremes as determinants for jury action are
suggested:
1) The jury should rationally determine the facts in an ab-
stract or vacuum-like manner and dispassionately apply the law
to these facts in reaching a verdict; i.e., Facts x law = verdict.
4 0 Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 Dall. 1 (1794). Mr. Chief Justice Jay in the firstjury trial before the U.S. Supreme Court charged the jury in part as follows,
... but it must be observed that by the same law which recognizes this reason-
able distribution of jurisdiction, you nevertheless have a right to take upon your-
selves to judge of both, and to determine the law as well as the facts in contro-
versy". Note: This view was later strongly repudiated in Sparf & Hansen v. United
States, 156 U.S. 51, 15 Sup. Ct. 273 (1899).
O "Scientific proof' may be taken as evidence upon which accepted modem
scientific theory unequivocally implies the existence of a fact upon which the law
will act. Mumford, Disregardof Scientific Proof by Juries, 41 Jout. oF Canm. LAw
& CrMsN. 320 (1951).
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2) Regardless of the law and the evidence the jury should
render its verdict for the party it thinks should win; i.e., jury
caprice or sympathy = verdict.
If the first hypothesis is accepted as the proper functional
process of trial juries; then, as juries are known to succumb to
emotion and sympathy at the expense of rules of law, they should
be supplanted by fact-finders of another variety, the judiciary,
possibly more accurate in that they are trained to judge the affairs
of men with cold dispassion.," Under the second hypothesis the
trial jury would constitute an irresponsible, dictatorial device for
usurping democratic principles. Somewhere in between the two
extremes lies the answer to the jury's function if the trial jury is
to be retained; if the apparent intent of our constitutional guar-
antees is to be carried out; if government by men is not to bow
irretrievably to government by law; if equity is at times to achieve
ascendency over the letter of the law.
It is obvious that no hard and fast line can be drawn between
the two extremes under consideration. Perhaps this means in-
dividual cases must receive individual treatment. But, society
reasonably expects some degree of certainty and predictability in
the verdicts of juries. On the other hand, are unanticipated situa-
tions or individual equities to be sacrificed through the applica-
tion of unyielding legal sanctions. We possibly feel that "strict
law" gives predictability in the administration of justice. Like-
wise it seems inescapable that rules of law are made for general
application and thus may become impersonal and arbitrary, lag-
ging behind social needs and changing concepts of justice.
Legal institutions formally express society's self-imposed stand-
ards of right and wrong, and institutions designed to effectuate
society's ever changing code of conduct should have a means of
acting in response to special circumstances as well as in reacting
to rules of law. This concept of moral justification in law is, of
course, shocking to exponents of a "strict law" theory which is an
outgrowth of immutable natural law concepts. Hence, it is timely
to forego the abstract at this moment for practical inquiries. Is it
the policy of the law that a "mercy killer" receive the same pun-
51 FAN, LAw AND THE MODERN MIND, 179 (1930). Query: will a judge,
if he is honest and a man of stature, tend to decide cases on hunch and fairness?
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ishment as one who kills in the process of robbing a bank? Under
the rule of law they are equally guilty. Which actor commits the
greater crime against society? Which actor, if unconfined, pre-
sents the greater menace to society? Can a legal wrong and a
moral right co-exist, where rules of conduct have not been
changed to fit new social norms? Is one who "could" have been
the father of an illegitimate child not to pay for his indiscretions
merely because science proves he is not the father? Is it desirable
that verdicts in personal injury actions constitute a guide to future
conduct to the extent deemed necessary in commercial trans-
actions and cases involving the transmission and devolution of
property?
Reflection on the above inquiries may cause one to emphasize
"justice" at the expense of "law", and such seems to be the current
trend of much legal thought. If so it be, then legal thought is
only beginning to catch up with the trial jury which has always
been the law's "escape valve" from the arbitrary administration of
justice. Is such flexibility in fact a state objective? If the objec-
tion is that such an objective is invalid when it ignores scientific
proof, then it must be remembered that science seeks to establish
certain discovered truths while the law seeks to control human
behaviour.
